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Abstract
The most usual procedure when facing decisions in complex set-
tings consists in consulting experts, aggregating the information they
provide, and deciding on the basis of this aggregated information. We
argue that such a procedure entails a substantial loss, insofar as it pre-
cludes the possibility to take into account simultaneously the decision
maker’s attitude towards conflict among experts and her attitude to-
wards imprecision of information. We propose to consider directly how
a decision maker behaves when using information coming from several
sources. We give an axiomatic foundation for a decision criterion that
allows to distinguish on a behavioral basis the decision maker’s attitude
towards imprecision and towards conflict.
Keywords. Decisions with multiple sources of information. Conflict aversion.
Imprecision aversion.
JEL Classification. D81, D83.
1 Introduction
When facing situations involving uncertainty, a decision maker might seek
the advice of experts. She will then make her decision on the basis of the
∗We thank I. Gilboa, Ch. Gollier, N. Vieille, and audience at the Toulouse Shcool of
Economics Theory seminar for useful comments and suggestions.
†CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique and CERSES. E-mail: gajdos@univ-paris1.fr.
‡CNRS, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne and CERSES. E-mail: vergnaud@univ-
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information gathered. Such would be the case, for instance, of a company who
consults experts in climate before deciding to invest in a ski resort. This raises
the following question: how to decide on the basis of an information coming
from several experts?
Clearly, different experts might have different opinions. Moreover, they
could also provide imprecise information. We argue that one should take this
two dimensions into account. Let us illustrate this point with the following
example. Suppose that two experts in climatic change give their predictions
about the frequency of snowy winters in the next thirty years. We allow the
experts to express their degrees of beliefs through probability intervals. The
size of the intervals captures the imprecision of their opinions. We compare
now three possible situations, described in the table below.
Expert 1 Expert 2
Situation A 1
2
1
2
Situation B 1
4
3
4
Situation C [1
4
, 3
4
] [1
4
, 3
4
]
Consider first situations A and B. A classical aggregation procedure is
the linear aggregation rule1. According to this rule (and assuming that both
experts are equally reliable), one would end in both situations with the same
aggregated information, namely that the frequency of snowy winter in the next
thirty years will be 1
2
. However, these two situations are rather different, as in
the first one experts reach a consensus, whereas in the second one they strongly
disagree. Thus, the aggregation procedure sweeps conflict under the rug.
A simple way out consists in aggregating experts opinions by probability
intervals. A natural candidate in situation B would be the interval [1
4
, 3
4
]. But
consider now situation C. Admittedly, any sensible aggregation rule should
respect unanimity among experts. Thus the aggregation in situation C should
also lead to the interval [1
4
, 3
4
]. However, situations B and C greatly differ.
Indeed, in situation B, experts provide strongly conflicting but precise infor-
mation, whereas in situation C, they provide strongly imprecise but similar
predictions. The aggregation procedure considered does not allow to distin-
guish between imprecision of, and conflict among, experts.
1This aggregating rule, applied to probability distributions, is known in the statistics
literature as the “pooling rule”. See Stone (1961), McConway (1981), and Genest and Zidek
(1986) for a survey.
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This example suggests that it might be tricky to find an aggregation pro-
cedure that takes into account simultaneously, in a satisfactory way, both im-
precision of experts assessments and conflict among them. This would not be
a problem if decision makers were indifferent between ambiguity coming from
imprecision of experts, or conflict among them. The few experimental studies
that have addressed this question to date suggest that such is not the case. In
particular, Smithson (1999) introduces the distinction between ”source con-
flict” and ”source ambiguity”. He formulated the following ”conflict aversion
hypothesis”:
Likewise, conflicting messages from two equally believable sources
may be more disturbing in general than two informatively equiva-
lent, ambiguous, but agreeing messages from the same sources.
Smithson (1999), p.184
Smithson finds evidence supporting this hypothesis in experiments with stu-
dents involving verbal statements. Cabantous (2007) conducted experiments
in a probabilistic setting (very similar to our example) with professional ac-
tuaries. She confirms the conflict aversion hypothesis, which means in this
context that situation C is preferred to situation B.
These results suggest that one should consider directly how a decision
maker behaves when using information coming from several sources. However,
to the best of our knowledge, there is no decision model that rationalizes the
conflict aversion hypothesis. We axiomatically characterize preferences that
exhibit independently aversion towards imprecision and conflict. We obtain a
two-step procedure. The first step consists in using separately experts assess-
ments in a multiple prior model. The second step consists in an aggregation of
these evaluations through a multiple weights model. Such a model is compati-
ble with the evidence found by Smithson (1999) and Cabantous (2007). More
precisely, a decision maker will satisfy the conflict aversion hypothesis when-
ever her degree of conflict aversion is higher than her degree of imprecision
aversion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present the formal setup
in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to the axiomatic characterization of the
decision maker preferences. We in particular introduce an axiom of conflict
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aversion. In Section 4 we present results on imprecision aversion and conflict
aversion.
2 Setup
Let Ω be a finite set of states of the world.2 Let ∆(Ω) be the set of all
probability distributions over Ω, and P be the family of compact and convex
subsets of ∆(Ω), where compactness is defined with regard to the Euclidean
space RΩ. The support of P ∈ P, denoted supp(P ), is defined as the union
over p ∈ P of the support of p.
The collection of information sets P is a mixture space under the operation
defined by
λP + (1− λ)Q = {λp+ (1− λ)q : p ∈ P, q ∈ Q}.
The set of pure outcomes is denoted by X. Let ∆(X) be the set of simple
lotteries (probability measures with finite supports) over X. Let F = {f :
Ω → ∆(X)} be the set of acts. Abusing notation, any lottery is viewed as a
constant act which delivers that lottery regardless of the states. The set F is
a mixture space under the operation defined by:
(αf + (1− α)g)(ω) = αf(ω) + (1− α)g(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω.
For E ∈ S , denote fEg the act that yields f(ω) if ω ∈ E and g(ω) if not. We
denote by F c the set of constant acts, and for all (x¯, x) ∈ X2, define F bx¯,x =
{f ∈ F |f(s) = (x¯, ps; x, 1− ps), ∀s ∈ Ω}, where (x¯, ps; x, 1 − ps) denotes the
lottery that yields x¯ with probability ps and x with probability (1− ps).
The decision maker is endowed with a preference relation < defined on
F ×P ×P. When
(f, P1, P2) < (g,Q1, Q2),
the decision maker prefers choosing f when, according to expert i, the true
probability distribution belongs to Pi (i ∈ {1, 2}) to choosing g when, accord-
ing to expert i, the true probability distribution belongs to Qi (i ∈ {1, 2}). The
2The finiteness assumption is not needed, and is only made for sake of simplicity. All our
results extend to the infinite countable case.
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behavioral meaning of this relation has been extensively discussed in Gajdos,
Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008), and we will not dwell on it here.
We derive from < a preference relation <∗ on F ×P as follows: (f, P ) <∗
(g,Q) iff (f, P, P ) < (g,Q,Q).
3 Representation
3.1 Axioms
Our axioms can be divided in two groups. The seven first axioms are simple ex-
tensions of the axioms used in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
They are used to derive a maxmin expected utility representation a` la Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989), in presence of objective information set. Whereas Gaj-
dos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008) only consider situations where one
information set is available, we consider here an objective information made
of a pair of probability distribution sets.
Axioms 1 to 6 exactly parallel Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axioms, so
we will not elaborate on them. We only insist on the fact that imprecision
aversion is captured through attitude towards mixture of acts (axiom 5). It is
traditionally related to uncertainty aversion (hence its name; see in particular
Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)). It turns out that in
our context, it also can be interpreted as imprecision aversion, exactly through
the same line of arguments. Axiom 7 parallels the classical (and crucial) c-
independence axiom. It imposes that mixing all information sets with the same
information set for both experts does not change preferences.
The two last axioms (Dominance and Conflict aversion) are specifically
related to the problem at hand.
Axiom 1 (Order). The preference relation < is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For all P,Q ∈ P, f, g, h ∈ F , if (f, P,Q) ≻ (g, P,Q) ≻
(h, P,Q) then there exist α and β in (0, 1) such that (αf + (1− α)h, P,Q) ≻
(g, P,Q) ≻ (βf + (1− β)h, P,Q).
Axiom 3 (Risk preferences). (i) For all f ∈ F c and P,Q ∈ P, (f, P ) ∼∗
(f,Q) and (ii) There exist f, g ∈ F , P ∈ P such that (f, P ) ≻∗ (g, P ).
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Axiom 4 (C-Independence). For all f, g ∈ F , h ∈ F c, P,Q ∈ P, α ∈ (0, 1),
(f, P,Q) < (g, P,Q)⇒ (αf + (1− α)h, P,Q) < (αg + (1− α)h, P,Q).
Axiom 5 (Uncertainty aversion). For all f, g ∈ F , P ∈ P, α ∈ (0, 1),
(f, P ) ∼∗ (g, P )⇒ (αf + (1− α)g, P ) <∗ (f, P ).
Axiom 6 (Monotonicity). For all f, g ∈ F , P ∈ P,
(f(ω), P ) <∗ (g(ω), P ) ∀ω ∈ supp(P )⇒ (f, P ) <∗ (g, P ).
Axiom 7 (I-Independence). For all f ∈ F , α ∈ (0, 1), P,Q,R ∈ P, if
(f, P ) <∗ (f,Q) then
(f, αP + (1− α)R) <∗ (g, αQ+ (1− α)R).
The next two axioms are more specifically related to the problem at hand
(namely, the aggregation of information). The first one states that if (i) the
decision maker prefers f when both experts agree on an information set P1 to
g when both experts agree on Q1, and (ii) she also prefers f when both experts
agree on an information set P2 to g when both experts agree on Q2, then she
prefers f when experts’ opinions are (P1, P2) to g when experts’ opinions are
(Q1, Q2). This is essentially a dominance axiom, similar in substance to the
traditional Pareto requirement.
Axiom 8 (Dominance). For all f, g ∈ F , P1, Q1, P2, Q2 ∈ P,
(f, P1) <
∗ (g,Q1)
(f, P2) <
∗ (g,Q2)
}
⇒ (f, P1, P2) < (g,Q1, Q2)
Moreover, if one of the preferences on the left-hand side is strict, so is the
preference on the right-hand side.
Our last axiom is related to conflict aversion. Given two information sets P ,
Q and α ∈ (0, 1), the information set αP+(1−α)Q can be seen as a compromise
between P andQ in the following sense. It is the set of probability distributions
obtained if one considers that the true probability distribution belongs to P
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with probability α, whereas it belongs toQ with probability (1−α). Our axiom
says that the decision maker always prefers when experts come in with opinions
that are less disparate, i.e., always prefers (f, αP + (1− α)Q,αQ+ (1− α)P )
to (f, P,Q).
Axiom 9 (Conflict aversion). For all f ∈ F , P,Q ∈ P, α ∈ (0, 1),
(f, αP + (1− α)Q,αQ+ (1− α)P ) < (f, P,Q).
3.2 Main result
We derive from our axioms the following representation.
Theorem 1. Axioms 1 to 9 are satisfied iff there exist a mixture-linear function
u : ∆(X) → R, a linear mapping ϕ : P → P satisfying supp(ϕ(P )) ⊆
supp(P ) and a symmetric closed and convex subset Π in ∆({1, 2}) such that
< can be represented by:
V (f, P,Q) = min
pi∈Π
π(1)
(
min
p∈ϕ(P )
∑
ω
u(f(ω))p(ω)
)
+π(2)
(
min
p∈ϕ(Q)
∑
ω
u(f(ω))p(ω)
)
.
Moreover u is unique up to a positive linear transformation, and ϕ and Π are
unique.
Maximizing this formula can be though of as a two-step procedure. First,
the decision maker transforms experts information through ϕ, and uses the
resulting sets of probability to evaluate the act under consideration. Second,
she aggregates linearly these two evaluations, using the worst weight vector
in a set Π. The first step deals with experts’ assessments. It is important to
observe that we face two very different kinds of sets of probability distributions.
Indeed, P and Q are strictly informational. They capture the information
available to the decision maker. ϕ(P ) and ϕ(Q) are the behavioral beliefs the
decision maker would use to evaluate acts if she were facing either P or Q3.
The mapping ϕ introduces a subjective treatment of an imprecise information.
In the second step, evaluations based on information provided by experts are
3In Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) celebrated maxmin expected utility model, only be-
havioral beliefs appear.
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aggregated. The set Π captures the decision maker’s attitude towards conflict
among valuations based on experts assessments.
Note that we also have:
V (f, P,Q) = min
p∈Π⊗(ϕ(P ),ϕ(Q))
∑
ω
u(f(ω))p(ω),
where Π ⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) = {π(1)p + π(2)q|π ∈ Π, p ∈ ϕ(P ), q ∈ ϕ(Q)}.
Thus maximizing this formula can be though of as first aggregating experts
information through Π⊗(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)), and then applying the maxmin expected
utility criterion over this set. Therefore Π⊗(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) has only a behavioral
meaning: it is related to the decision maker’s preferences.
Finally, note that a different route is also possible: It consists in aggregat-
ing behavioral beliefs of experts into behavioral beliefs of the decision maker.
It essentially amounts to ask the experts what their own decision would be
(possibly assuming that they would evaluate consequences the same way as
the decision maker) and to aggregate these stated preferences. A large liter-
ature in social choice theory has been elaborated along these lines, following
Harsanyi (1955) seminal paper4. See among others Mongin (1995), Gilboa,
Samet, and Schmeidler (2004), Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008).
Indeed, this problem has also been addressed by Cre`s, Gilboa, and Vieille
(2009), who consider the problem of aggregating preferences of Maxmin Ex-
pected Utility maximizers who share the same utility function into a Maxmin
Expected utility. They show that under Pareto constraint, the aggregate set
of priors takes the form Π ⊗ (P1, . . . , Pn), where Pi denotes individual i’s set
of priors. They thus aggregate behavioral beliefs into behavioral beliefs.5
4Although Harsanyi (1955) actually considers the case where experts share the same
beliefs, and disagree on valuations. But it really laid the foundations for the aggregation of
experts behavioral beliefs.
5Actually, one can also interpret experts beliefs in Cre`s, Gilboa, and Vieille (2009) as
informational beliefs. But then it implies that the decision maker is forced to be extremely
averse towards uncertainty.
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4 Attitude towards uncertainty and conflict
4.1 General definitions and characterization
We now turn to the behavioral characterization of imprecision and conflict
aversion. We use the standard comparative approach.
We first define comparative imprecision aversion as in Gajdos, Tallon, and
Vergnaud (2004) and Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008). Let a
and b be two decision makers. We will say that b is more averse to imprecision
than a if, whenever a prefers a precise situation to an imprecise one, so does b.
In order to control for risk aversion, this definition is restricted to binary acts.
Definition 1. Let %∗a and %
∗
b be two preference relations defined on F ×P.
Suppose there exist two prizes x¯, x in X such that both a and b strictly prefer
x¯ to x. We say that <∗b is more averse to imprecision than <
∗
a whenever for
all f ∈ F bx¯,x, p ∈ ∆(Ω), P ∈ P
(f, {p}) <∗a (f, P )⇒ (f, {p}) <
∗
b (f, P ).
The following proposition shows how ϕ is related to the decision maker’s
attitude towards imprecision. Intuitively, the more ϕ “shrinks” P , the less
imprecision averse is the decision maker.
Proposition 1. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. <∗b is more averse to imprecision than <
∗
a,
2. for all P ∈ P, ϕa(P ) ⊂ ϕb(P ).
Comparative conflict aversion will be defined along the same line as com-
parative imprecision aversion. It simply states that decision maker b is more
averse to conflict than decision maker a if, whenever a prefers a consensual
situation to a situation with divergent information, so does b.
Assume that a decision maker strictly prefers (f, P, P ) to (f,Q,Q). Then
(by axiom 8) she will have the following preferences: (f, P, P ) < (f, P,Q) <
(f,Q,Q). Now, consider R(α) = αP + (1 − α)Q. Of course, the larger α,
the better (f, R(α), R(α)). Since (f, R(1), R(1)) < (f, P,Q) < (f, R(0), R(0)),
there is an (unique) αˆ such that (f, R(αˆ), R(αˆ)) ∼ (f, P,Q). Loosely speaking,
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R(αˆ) is the worst consensual information that the decision maker considers as
equivalent to (P,Q) when facing act f . Thus (1− αˆ) can be seen as the “price”
she is ready to pay to avoid conflict. Decision maker b is more averse to conflict
than decision maker a if b is ready to “pay” a higher price to avoid conflict.
Definition 2. Let %a and %b be two preference relations defined on F ×P×
P. We say that %b is more averse to conflict than %a if for all f ∈ F ,
P,Q ∈ P, α ∈ (0, 1), such that both a and b prefers (f, P ) to (f,Q) if :
(f, αP + (1− α)Q,αP + (1− α)Q) <a (f, P,Q)
then,
(f, αP + (1− α)Q,αP + (1− α)Q) <b (f, P,Q).
The following Proposition shows how Π is related to the decision maker’s
attitude towards conflict. Intuitively, the larger Π, the more averse to conflict
is the decision maker.
Proposition 2. The following assertions are equivalent:
1. <b is more averse to conflict than <a,
2. Πa ⊆ Πb.
4.2 The two states case
In order to illustrate our results, let us consider the specific situation where
there are only two states, and ϕ is symmetric, i.e., for all permutation ρ :
Ω → Ω, and all P ∈ P ρ((ϕ(P )) = ϕ(Pρ), where ρ (ϕ(P )) = {p|∃q ∈
ϕ(P ), q(ρ(ω)) = p(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω} and Pρ = {p|∃q ∈ P, q(ρ(ω)) = p(ω), ∀ω ∈
Ω}.
In this case, ϕ and Π take the following parametric form:
ϕ(P ) = {(1− θ)c(P ) + θp|p ∈ P} ,
where θ ∈ [0, 1] and c(P ) is the center of P , and
Π =
{
(1− α)
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
+ α(t, 1− t)
∣∣∣ t ∈ [0, 1]} ,
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where α ∈ [0, 1]. In other words, ϕ(P ) is a contraction of P around its center,
with a contraction rate equal to (1 − θ), whereas Π is a symmetric set of
probabilities. In view of Propositions 1 and 2, θ can be interpreted as a measure
of imprecision aversion (imprecision aversion increases with θ) whereas α can
be interpreted as a measure of conflict aversion (conflict aversion increases with
α).
The traditional aggregation approach assumes that decisions with informa-
tion coming from various experts can be made in two steps. First, information
provided by experts is somehow aggregated into a unique piece of information;
then this aggregated information is used by the decision maker, who trans-
forms it into behavioral beliefs. A classical example of this kind of decision
process is the traditional cost-benefit analysis. Expert commission transmits
the information concerning the likelihood of the relevant events, outcomes
are evaluated separately, and the policy maker uses a decision rule based on
transmitted information and outcome evaluation. This is typically the case
for environmental and health issues (e.g., global warming, new diseases). The
problem can then be reduced to independent questions. First, how should we
aggregate experts opinions? Second, what should be the decision, given this
aggregated information?
It is natural to wonder whether it is always possible to reduce the behavioral
approach we follow to the traditional two-steps aggregation? This would be
the case if any pair of statements is equivalent for the decision maker (from the
informational point of view) to some statement coming from a single source.
In other words, for all P,Q, there should exist R such that for all f , (f, P,Q) ∼
(f, R,R). As shown by the following proposition, such is actually not the case.
When there are only two states and ϕ is symmetric, the classical procedure
and our approach are equivalent iff the decision maker degree of uncertainty
aversion is larger than her degree of conflict aversion. Note that in these
situations, the conflict aversion hypothesis described and observed by Smithson
(1999) and Cabantous (2007) will not be satisfied.
Proposition 3. Assume |Ω| = 2 and ϕ(P ) is symmetric. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) For all P,Q ∈ P, there exists R ∈ P such that Π ⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) =
ϕ(R);
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(ii) θ ≥ α.
In some specific cases we can even be more specific. For instance, if Q ⊆ P ,
there always exists R such that ϕ(R) = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) as soon as θ > 0. R
is then simply:
R =
(
1 + α
2
)
P +
(
1− α
2
)
Q.
The example discussed in the introduction suggested that it might be dif-
ficult to take into account simultaneously the decision maker attitude towards
imprecision and conflict when using a two-steps aggregation procedure. In-
deed, it must then be the case that attitude towards conflict only appears in
the first step, whereas attitude towards imprecision only appears in the second
step. This would not be a problem if the two steps commute (i.e. if the tra-
ditional procedure were equivalent to first transforming experts informational
beliefs into several behavioral beliefs, and then aggregating these behavioral
beliefs). But, as shown by the following proposition, such is the case only if
the decision maker is extremely averse to imprecision. Although this result is
only proved with two states and a symmetric ϕ, it suggests that the behavioral
approach we followed is significantly wider than the traditional one.
Proposition 4. Assume |Ω| = 2 and ϕ(P ) is symmetric. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) For all P,Q ∈ P, Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) = ϕ (Π⊗ (P,Q));
(ii) θ = 1.
Finally, we suggested in the introduction that a natural way to aggregate
information so as to take into account the decision maker attitude towards
conflict consists in considering the unions of the pieces of information provided
by the experts. It is thus a natural question to ask if this rule can be obtained
in our framework. The answer is: yes. It actually corresponds to the case of
extreme aversion towards both conflict and imprecision.
Proposition 5. Assume |Ω| = 2 and ϕ(P ) is symmetric. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) For all P,Q ∈ P, Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) = ϕ(co(P ∪Q));
(ii) (α, θ) = (1, 1).
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5 Illustration
We illustrate our approach through the following example. Assume Ω = {1, 2}.
Consider the four following situations.
A. PA1 = {
1
4
} and PA2 = {
3
4
};
B. PB1 = P
B
2 = {p|
1
4
≤ p(1) ≤ 3
4
};
C. PC1 = {p|
1
4
≤ p(1) ≤ 3
8
} and PC2 = {p|
5
8
≤ p(1) ≤ 3
4
};
D. PD1 = P
B
1 and P
D
2 = {p|
3
8
≤ p(1) ≤ 5
8
}.
These four situations are depicted on the following graph, where the range
of p(1) is depicted.
We assume that ϕ and Π are defined as in Section 4. Let Ψ(P i1, P
i
2) =
Π⊗ (ϕ(P i1), ϕ(P
i
2)) (i ∈ {A,B,C,D}). Simple computations lead to:
A. Ψ(PA1 , P
A
2 ) = {p|
2−α
4
≤ p(1) ≤ 2+α
4
};
B. Ψ(PB1 , P
B
2 ) = {p|
1−θ
4
≤ p(1) ≤ 2+θ
4
};
C. Ψ(PC1 , P
C
2 ) = {p|
8−3α−θ
16
≤ p(1) ≤ 8+3α+θ
16
};
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D. Ψ(PD1 , P
D
2 ) = {p|
5−αθ+3(1−θ)
16
≤ p(1) ≤ 11+αθ−3(1−θ)
16
}.
Clearly, if Ψ(P i1, P
i
2) ⊂ Ψ(P
j
1 , P
j
2 ), the decision maker prefers the situation
6
where the available information is (P i1, P
i
2) to the situation where the available
information is (P j1 , P
j
2 ). The following table summarize the results. Situations
are listed from the best to the worst, for different values of the parameters.
1 ≥ θ ≥ 3α
α+2
3α
α+2
≥ θ ≥ 4α
3+α
4α
3+α
≥ θ ≥ α α ≥ θ ≥ 0
A A D D
C D A B
D C C C
B B B A
Note that increasing imprecision aversion implies moving from the right
to the left of the table, whereas increasing conflict aversion implies moving
from the left to the right. Thus, as imprecision aversion increases (ceteris
paribus) A and C are ranked higher, and B and D lower. The converse is true
when conflict aversion increases. Observe that the conflict aversion hypothesis
corresponds to the situation where situation B is better than situation A, i.e.,
the last column. Unsurprisingly, it is obtained when the degree of conflict
aversion is higher than the degree of imprecision aversion.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Necessity is easily checked. We thus only prove sufficiency.
By Proposition 2 in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008), we
have:
Lemma 1. If axioms 1 to 7 hold, then there exist a function U : F ×P →
R which represents <∗, a mixture-linear function u : ∆(X) → R, a linear
mapping ϕ : P → P satisfying supp(ϕ(P )) ⊆ supp(P ) such that:
U(f, P ) = min
p∈ϕ(P )
Epu(f).
6We say that a decision maker prefers a situation (P, Q) to a situation (P ′, Q′) when for
any bet, she prefers betting in situation (P, Q) rather than in situation (P ′, Q′).
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Moreover u is unique up to a positive linear transformation, and ϕ is unique.
According to Lemma 1, u is unique up to a positive linear transformation,
which implies that we can choose u such that U(h1, P ) = 1 and U(h2, P ) = −1
for some constant acts h1, h2, and for any P .
Lemma 2. {(U(f, P ), (f,Q))|f ∈ F , P,Q ∈ P} = rangeU × rangeU.
Proof. Let K = {(U(f, P ), U(f,Q))|f ∈ F , P,Q ∈ P}, and D = rangeU ×
rangeU . We have to show that D ⊆ K. Let f, g ∈ F and P,Q ∈ P. By
axiom 6 there exist f¯ and f in F such that (f¯ , P ) <∗ (f, P ) <∗ (f, P ). Thus,
by axiom 2 there exists θ ∈ [0, 1] such that (θf¯ + (1 − θ)f, P ) ∼∗ (f, P ). Let
f c = θf¯ + (1 − θ)f . Observe that f c ∈ F c and U(f, P ) = U(f c, P ). Define
similarly gc as the constant act such that (gc, Q) ∼ (g,Q). We also have, of
course, U(g,Q) = U(gc, Q). Now, fix any event E ⊂ Ω, E 6= Ω, and let P ′, Q′ ∈
P be such that supp(P ′) ⊆ E and supp(Q′) ⊆ Ω \E. We have U(f cEg
c, P ′) =
U(f c, P ) by axioms 3 and 6. Thus U(f cEg
c, P ′) = U(f, P ). Similarly, we have
U(f cEg
c, Q′) = U(gc, Q′) = U(g,Q). Thus (U(f, P ), U(g,Q)) ∈ K, the desired
result.
By axioms 1 and 2, there exists a continuous function V : F×P×P → R
that represents <. By axiom 8, and Lemma 2 there exists an increasing,
continuous function V˜ : D → R such that for all f ∈ F and P,Q ∈ P:
V (f, P,Q) = V˜ (U(f, P ), U(f,Q)) .
Moreover, given U , V can be chosen such that V (f, P, P ) = U(f, P ) (since
V (f, P, P ) represents <∗ as well). The two following steps essentially mimic
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)’s and Chateauneuf (1991) proofs.
Lemma 3. For all w ∈ D, α ∈ [0, 1] such that αw ∈ D, V˜ (αw) = αV˜ (w).
Proof. Pick f0 ∈ F
c such that U(f0, P ) = 0 (this is possible, given the nor-
malization we choose for V ). Let w = (w1, w2) ∈ D . By Lemma 2 there
exist f ∈ F , Q1, Q2 ∈ P such that U(f,Q1) = w1 and U(f,Q2) = w2.
By definition of V˜ and V we have V (f,Q1, Q2) = V˜ (w). By axioms 2, 3
and 6 there exists h ∈ F c such that (h,Q1, Q2) ∼ (f,Q1, Q2). By axiom 4,
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(αh+(1−α)f0, Q1, Q2) ∼ (αf +(1−α)f0, Q1, Q2) for all α ∈ [0, 1]. By axiom
3, (αh+ (1− α)f0, Q1, Q2) ∼ (αh+ (1− α)f0, Q1, Q1). Thus
V (αh+ (1− α)f0, Q1, Q2) = V (αh+ (1− α)f0, Q1, Q1)
= U(αh+ (1− α)f0, Q1), by the normalization of V
= αU(h,Q1) + (1− α)U(f0, Q1) by c−linearity of U
= αU(h,Q1), since U(f0, Q1) = 0
= αV (h,Q1, Q1), by the normalization of V
= αV (h,Q1, Q2), by axiom 3
= αV (f,Q1, Q2), by definition of h
= αV˜ (w).
On the other hand,
V (αf + (1− α)f0, Q1, Q2)
= V˜ (U(αf + (1− α)f0, Q1), U(αf + (1− α)f0, Q2))
= V˜ (αU(f,Q1) + (1− α)U(f0, Q1), αU(f,Q2) + (1− α)U(f0, Q2)),
by c−linearity of U
= V˜ (αU(f,Q1), αU(f,Q2)) since U(f0, P ) = 0
= V˜ (αw).
Thus V˜ (αw) = αV˜ (w) for all α ∈ [0, 1], and thus for all α ∈ R+.
We extend V˜ to R2 by homogeneity, and still call V˜ its extension (which is
homogeneous and monotone).
Lemma 4. For all w ∈ R2, µ ∈ R, V˜ (w + (µ, µ)) = V˜ (w) + µ.
Proof. Let w1, w2, µ be such that 2w1, 2w2, 2µ ∈ rangeU . Given the homo-
geneity of V˜ , this assumption is without any loss of generality. Let f ∈ F ,
h1, h2 ∈ F
c and P,Q ∈ P be such that U(f, P ) = 2w1, U(f,Q) = 2w2,
(h1, P,Q) ∼ (f, P,Q) and U(h2, P ) = 2µ. Since (h1, P,Q) ∼ (f, P,Q), axiom
4 implies (1
2
h1 +
1
2
h2, P,Q) ∼ (
1
2
f + 1
2
h2, P,Q). Thus:
V˜ (U(
1
2
h1+
1
2
h2, P ), U(
1
2
h1+
1
2
h2, Q)) = V˜ (U(
1
2
f +
1
2
h2, P ), U(
1
2
f +
1
2
h2, Q)),
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which implies
U(
1
2
h1 +
1
2
h2, P ) = V˜ (
1
2
U(f, P ) +
1
2
U(h2, P ),
1
2
U(f,Q) +
1
2
U(h2, Q)).
Therefore,
V˜ (w1 + µ, w2 + µ) =
1
2
U(h1, P ) +
1
2
U(h2, P )
=
1
2
V˜ (U(h1, P ), U(h1, Q)) + µ, by homogeneity of U
=
1
2
V (h1, P,Q) + µ, by normalization of V
=
1
2
V (f, P,Q) + µ
=
1
2
V˜ (U(f, P ), U(f,Q)) + µ
=
1
2
V˜ (2w1, 2w2) + µ
= V˜ (w1, w2) + µ,
the desired result.
It remains to show that V˜ is symmetric and concave. This is the key part
of the proof, where the conflict aversion axiom plays a crucial role.
Lemma 5. V˜ is symmetric.
Proof. We first show that V˜ is symmetric. Without loss of generality (because
of the homogeneity of V˜ ), choose w,w′ ∈ D . Let f ∈ F and P,Q ∈ P be
such that U(f, P ) = w1 and U(f,Q) = w2. Let α ∈ [0, 1]. We have:
V˜ (αw1 + (1− α)w2, αw2 + (1− α)w1)
= V˜ (αU(f, P ) + (1− α)U(f,Q), αU(f,Q) + (1− α)U(f, P ))
= V˜ (U(f, αP + (1− α)Q), U(αQ+ (1− α)P )), by linearity of ϕ.
Thus axiom 9 implies for all w1, w2 ∈ R (by homogeneity) and all α ∈ [0, 1]:
V˜ (αw1 + (1− α)w2, αw2 + (1− α)w1) ≥ V˜ (w1, w2).
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Thus, in particular, V˜ must be symmetric. Indeed, setting α = 0, we obtain
V˜ (w2, w1) ≥ V˜ (w1, w2). Permuting w1 and w2 yields V˜ (w1, w2) ≥ V˜ (w2, w2),
and thus V˜ (w1, w2) = V˜ (w2, w1).
Lemma 6. V˜ is concave.
Proof. Step 1.
Let w = (w1, w2) and w
′ = (w′1, w
′
2) in D be such that V˜ (w) = V˜ (w
′),
w1 ≤ w2, w
′
1 ≤ w
′
2, and w¯ = (t, t) ∈ D be such that V˜ (w¯) = V˜ (w) (by axioms
2 and 8, such an w¯ exists). Without loss of generality, assume 0 < w1 ≤ w
′
1
(and thus, by axiom 8, w2 ≥ w
′
2) and 0 < w
′
2. First, we show that there exists
θ ∈ [0, 1] such that w′ = θw+(1− θ)w¯. Assume that such is not the case. Let
λ > 0 be such that λw′ ∈ [w, w¯], and let θˆ be such that λw′ = θˆw + (1− θˆ)w¯.
Since w′ /∈ [w, w¯], λ 6= 1. Thus, by axiom 8, either V˜ (λw′) > V˜ (w′) or
V˜ (λw′) < V˜ (w′). But by lemma 3 and 4, V˜ (λw′) = V˜ (θˆw + (1 − θˆ)w¯) =
θV˜ (w) + (1− θ)V˜ (w¯) = V˜ (w) = V˜ (w′), a contradiction.
Thus, let θ be such that w′ = θw + (1− θ)w¯. Then, for all α ∈ [0, 1],
V˜ (αw + (1− α)w′) = V˜ (αw + (1− α)(θw + (1− θ)w¯))
= V˜ ((α + (1− α)θ)w + (1− α)(1− θ)w¯)
= (α + (1− α)θ)V˜ (w) + (1− α)(1− θ)V˜ (w¯)
= V˜ (w)
= αV˜ (w) + (1− α)V˜ (w′),
where the third equality follows by c−affinity and homogeneity of V˜ .
Step 2.
Assume now that w = (w1, w2) and w
′ = (w′1, w
′
2) are D such that V˜ (w) =
V˜ (w′), w1 ≤ w2, w
′
1 ≥ w
′
2, and w¯ = (t, t) ∈ D be such that V˜ (w¯) = V˜ (w). We
assume, without loss of generality, 0 < w1 ≤ w
′
2 (and thus, by axiom 8 and
lemma 5, w2 ≥ w
′
2) and 0 < w
′
2.
By lemma 5, V˜ (w1, w2) = V˜ (w2, w1). Thus V˜ (w2, w1) = V˜ (w
′
1, w
′
2). By the
preceding argument, there exits θ ∈ [0, 1] such that w′ = θ(w2, w1) + (1− θ)w¯.
Therefore, for all α ∈ [0, 1]:
V˜ (αw + (1− α)w′) = V˜ (αw + (1− α)(θ(w2, w1) + (1− θ)w¯))
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= V˜ ((αw + (1− α)θ(w2, w2)) + (1− α)(1− θ)w¯)
= (α + (1− α)θ)V˜
(
α
α + (1− α)θ
w +
1− α
α + (1− α)θ
(w2, w1)
)
+(1− α)(1− θ)V˜ (w¯), by c−affinitiy and homogeneity of V˜
≥ (α + (1− α)θ)V˜ (w) + (1− α)(1− θ)V˜ (w¯), by axiom 9,
and therefore V˜ (αw + (1− α)w′) ≥ V˜ (w), the desired result.
Step 3.
It remains to deal with the case where V˜ (w) 6= V˜ (w′). Assume without
loss of generality that V˜ (w) > V˜ (w′). Let µ = V˜ (w) − V˜ (w′). Define w˜ =
w′ + (µ, µ). By c-affinity of V˜ , we have V˜ (w˜) = V˜ (w′) + µ = V˜ (w). Thus, for
all α ∈ [0, 1],
V˜ (αw˜ + (1− α)w) ≥ αV˜ (w˜) + (1− α)V˜ (w), by steps 1 and 2
≥ αV˜ (w′) + (1− α)V˜ (w) + αµ.
On the other hand,
V˜ (αw˜ + (1− α)w) = V˜ (α(w′ + µ) + (1− α)w)
= V˜ (αw′ + (1− α)w) + αµ by c−affinitiy of V˜ .
Therefore V˜ (αw′+ (1−α)w) ≥ αV˜ (w′)+ (1−α)V˜ (w), the desired result.
By Lemma 3, 4 and 6, V˜ is concave and homogeneous of degree 1, and
c−affine. Therefore, by a classical result (see, e.g., the “Fundamental Lemma”
in Chateauneuf (1991) and Lemma 3.5 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), there
exists a unique closed and convex set Π such that V˜ (w1, w2) = minpi∈Π π(1)w1+
π(2)w2. Furthermore, by lemma 5, Π is symmetric. Lemma 1 yields to Theo-
rem 1.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
This proposition is in the vein of Theorem 3 in Gajdos, Tallon, and Vergnaud
(2004) and Theorem 4 in Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008). For
sake of exactness, we adapt the proof here.
It is straightforward to check that 2 implies 1.
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Conversely, suppose ad absurdum that <∗b is more averse to imprecision
than <∗a but that there exists p
∗ ∈ ϕa(P ) such that p /∈ ϕb(P ). Using a
separation argument, there exists a function φ : Ω → R such that Ep∗φ <
minp∈ϕb(P )Epφ. Let x¯ and x in X be such that both a and b strictly prefer
x¯ to x. Note that we can choose by normalization ua and ub so that ua(x¯) =
ub(x¯) = 1 > ua(x) = ub(x) = 0. Since Ω is a finite set, there exist numbers
m > 0 and ℓ, such that for all ω ∈ Ω, mφ(ω) + ℓ ∈ [0, 1]. Let αω = mφ(ω)+ ℓ,
ω ∈ Ω. Let f 0 ∈ F bx¯,x such that f
0(ω) = αωδx¯ + (1 − αω)δx for all ω ∈ Ω.
Then, Ep∗u(f
0) < minp∈ϕb(P )Epu(f
0) which implies that (f, P ) ≻∗b (f, {p
∗}).
However, since p∗ ∈ ϕa(P ), Ep∗u(f
0) ≥ minp∈ϕa(P )Epu(f
0) which implies that
(f, {p∗}) <∗a (f, P ) and thus yields a contradiction with <
∗
b being more averse
to imprecision than <∗a.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Since Πa and Πb are symmetric, there exist αa and αb such that Πa = {(1 −
αa)(
1
2
, 1
2
+αa(t, 1−t)|t ∈ [0, 1]} and Πb = {(1−αb)(
1
2
, 1
2
+αb(t, 1−t)|t ∈ [0, 1]}.
For all f ∈ F , P,Q ∈ P, α ∈ (0, 1), i = a, b, (f, αP + (1 − α)Q,αP + (1 −
α)Q) <i (f, P,Q) iff:
min
p∈ϕi(αP+(1−α)Q)
Epu(f) ≥ min
(pi,1−pi)∈Πi
(
π min
p∈ϕi(P )
Epu(f) + (1− π) min
p∈ϕi(Q)
Epu(f)
)
.
Since the ϕi are linear, we then obtain:
α min
p∈ϕi(P )
Epu(f) + (1− α) min
p∈ϕi(Q)
Epu(f)
≥
(
1 + αi
2
)
min
(
min
p∈ϕi(P )
Epu(f), min
p∈ϕi(Q)
Epu(f)
)
+
(
1− αi
2
)
max
(
min
p∈ϕi(P )
Epu(f), min
p∈ϕi(Q)
Epu(f)
)
Furthermore, if both a and b prefer (f, P ) to (f,Q), then (f, αP + (1 −
α)Q,αP + (1− α)Q) <i (f, P,Q) iff α ≥
1−αi
2
.
Thus if <b is more averse to conflict than <a, then
1−αa
2
≥ 1−αb
2
and thus
Πa ⊆ Πb. Conversely, if Πa ⊆ Πb, then <b is more averse to conflict than <a.
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6.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Assume without loss of generality that Ω = {1, 2}. Let δ1 = (1, 0), δ2 = (0, 1)
and δ12 = {p = (p1, p2) ∈ [0, 1]
2|p1 + p2 = 1}. Any set P ∈ P can be written
in a unique way as: P = γ1δ1 + γ2δ2 + γ3δ12, with γ1, γ2, γ3 ≥ 0 such that
γ1 + γ2 + γ3 = 1.
For all R = γ1δ1 + γ2δ2 + γ3δ12, and all θ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
ϕ(R) =
(
γ1 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ1 +
(
γ2 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ2 + θγ3δ12.
Let P = λ1δ1+λ2δ2+λ3δ12, Q = λ
′
1δ1+λ
′
2δ2+λ
′
3δ12 and α ∈ [0, 1], θ ∈ [0, 1].
Without any loss of generality, let us assume that λ′1 +
1−θ
2
λ′3 ≥ λ1 +
1−θ
2
λ3.
Consider a first case where θ = 0. Then
ϕ(P ) =
(
λ1 +
λ3
2
)
δ1 +
(
λ2 +
λ3
2
)
δ2,
ϕ(Q) =
(
λ′1 +
λ′3
2
)
δ1 +
(
λ′2 +
λ′3
2
)
δ2.
Simple computations show that
Π⊗ (aδ1 + (1− a)δ2, bδ1 + (1− b)δ2)
=
(
1 + α
2
a+
1− α
2
b
)
δ1 +
(
1− α
2
a+
1 + α
2
b
)
δ2 + (b− a)αδ12
if a ≤ b.
If R is such that ϕ(R) = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)), then we must have
ϕ(R) =
(
γ1 +
γ3
2
)
δ1 +
(
γ2 +
γ3
2
)
δ2 = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q))
=
(
1 + α
2
a+
1− α
2
b
)
δ1 +
(
1− α
2
a+
1 + α
2
b
)
δ2 + (b− a)αδ12,
where a = λ1 +
λ3
2
and b = λ′1 +
λ′
3
2
.
Therefore, we must have α = 0 and thus θ ≥ α.
Conversely, if θ = α = 0, for R = Π⊗(P,Q), ϕ(R) = Π⊗(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) and
thus for all P,Q ∈ P, there exists R ∈ P such that Π⊗(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) = ϕ(R).
Let suppose now that θ > 0. We show first that (i) implies (ii). Consider
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the case where λ2 = 1 and λ
′
1 = 1. Then:
Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) = Π⊗ (δ2, δ1)
=
1− α
2
δ1 +
1− α
2
δ2 + αδ12.
If R is such that ϕ(R) = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)), then we must have:
ϕ(R) =
(
γ1 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ1 +
(
γ2 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ2 + θγ3δ12
= Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) =
1− α
2
δ1 +
1− α
2
δ2 + αδ12.
Thus γ3 =
α
θ
and for α > θ, γ3 > 1 which yields a contradiction.
We now show that (ii) implies (i). Assume that θ ≥ α and consider two
subcases.
Case where λ′2 +
(1−θ)λ′
3
2
≥ λ2 +
(1−θ)λ3
2
(it correponds to the case where
Q ⊆ P ).
Simple computations show that
Π⊗ (a1δ1 + a2δ2 + (1− a1 − a2)δ12, b1δ1 + b2δ2 + (1− b1 − b2)δ12)
=
(
1 + α
2
a1 +
1− α
2
b1
)
δ1 +
(
1 + α
2
a2 +
1− α
2
b2
)
δ2
+
[(
1 + α
2
)
(1− a1 − a2) +
(
1− α
2
)
(1− b1 − b2)
]
δ12
if a1 ≤ b1 and a2 ≤ b2.
If R is such that ϕ(R) = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)), we must have
ϕ(R) =
(
γ1 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ1 +
(
γ2 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ2 + θγ3δ12
= Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q))
=
(
1 + α
2
a1 +
1− α
2
b1
)
δ1 +
(
1 + α
2
a2 +
1− α
2
b2
)
δ2
+
[(
1 + α
2
)
(1− a1 − a2) +
(
1− α
2
)
(1− b1 − b2)
]
δ12
where a1 = λ1+
1−θ
2
λ3, a2 = λ2+
(1−θ)
2
λ3, b1 = λ
′
1+
1−θ
2
λ′3 and b2 = λ
′
2+
(1−θ)
2
λ′3.
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Therefore, we have:
γ1 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
=
1 + α
2
a1 +
1− α
2
b1
γ2 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
=
1 + α
2
a2 +
1− α
2
b2
θγ3 =
(
1 + α
2
)
(1− a1 − a2) +
(
1− α
2
)
(1− b1 − b2),
which leads to
γ1 =
1 + α
2
λ1 +
1− α
2
λ′1
γ2 =
1 + α
2
λ2 ++
1− α
2
λ′2
γ3 =
(
1 + α
2
)
λ3 +
(
1− α
2
)
λ′3,
which are three values between 0 and 1. In fact, when Q ⊆ P , there always
exists R such that ϕ(R) = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) as soon as θ > 0. R is simply:
R =
(
1 + α
2
)
P +
(
1− α
2
)
Q.
Case where λ2 +
(1−θ)λ3
2
≥ λ′2 +
(1−θ)λ′
3
2
.
Simple computation gives that
Π⊗ (a1δ1 + a2δ2 + (1− a1 − a2)δ12, b1δ1 + b2δ2 + (1− b1 − b2)δ12)
=
(
1 + α
2
a1 +
1− α
2
b1
)
δ1 +
(
1− α
2
a2 +
1 + α
2
b2
)
δ2
+
[(
1 + α
2
)
(1− a1 − b2) +
(
1− α
2
)
(1− b1 − a2)
]
δ12
if a1 ≤ b1 and a2 ≥ b2.
If R is such that ϕ(R) = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)), then we must have
ϕ(R) =
(
γ1 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ1 +
(
γ2 +
(1− θ)γ3
2
)
δ2 + θγ3δ12
= Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q))
=
(
1 + α
2
a1 +
1− α
2
b1
)
δ1 +
(
1− α
2
a2 +
1 + α
2
b2
)
δ2
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+[(
1 + α
2
)
(1− a1 − b2) +
(
1− α
2
)
(1− b1 − a2)
]
δ12
where a1 = λ1+
1−θ
2
λ3, a2 = λ2+
(1−θ)
2
λ3, b1 = λ
′
1+
1−θ
2
λ′3 and b2 = λ
′
2+
(1−θ)
2
λ′3.
To show that there exists R, we first show that we can find γ3 such that
1 ≥ γ3 ≥ 0 and such that
θγ3 =
(
1 + α
2
)
(1− a1 − b2) +
(
1− α
2
)
(1− b1 − a2).
Then we must have:
γ3 =
1
2
[
λ3 + λ
′
3 +
α
θ
(λ′1 − λ1 + λ2 − λ
′
2)
]
.
Since λ′1 +
1−θ
2
λ′3 ≥ λ1 +
1−θ
2
λ3 and λ2 +
(1−θ)λ3
2
≥ λ′2 +
(1−θ)λ′
3
2
we have:
λ′1 − λ1 ≥
1− θ
2
(λ3 − λ
′
3)
λ2 − λ
′
2 ≥
1− θ
2
(λ′3 − λ3)
and thus
λ′1 − λ1 + λ2 − λ
′
2 ≥ 0.
Therefore γ3 ≥ 0.
On the other hand, since θ ≥ α,
γ3 ≤
1
2
[λ3 + λ
′
3 + λ
′
1 − λ1 + λ2 − λ
′
2] = [λ2 + λ3 + λ
′
1 + λ
′
3 − 1] ≤ 1.
That means that we can always find a γ3 that fits for the size of the prob-
ability interval Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)).
It remains to be shown that we can find γ1 and γ2 that can adjust for
the margins. Let χ be the size of the probability interval Π ⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)).
Once χ is fixed, and thus γ3 =
χ
θ
, we can find γ1 and γ2 values such that
ϕ(R) = τδ1 + (1− χ− τ) δ2 + χδ12 for any τ ∈
[
(1−θ)
2
χ
θ
, 1− χ
θ
+ (1−θ)
2
χ
θ
]
.
On the other hand, the weight on δ1 in the decomposition of Π⊗(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q))
is equal to 1+α
2
(
λ1 +
1−θ
2
λ3
)
+ 1−α
2
(
λ′1 +
1−θ
2
λ′3
)
with
χ =
1
2
[θ (λ3 + λ
′
3) + α(λ
′
1 − λ1 + λ2 − λ
′
2)] .
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For χ fixed, to minimize τ ′ = 1+α
2
(
λ1 +
1−θ
2
λ3
)
+ 1−α
2
(
λ′1 +
1−θ
2
λ′3
)
, we have to
consider λ1 = λ
′
1 = 0. Then
χ =
1
2
[θ (λ3 + λ
′
3) + α(λ
′
3 − λ3)] ,
while
τ ′ =
1 + α
2
1− θ
2
λ3 +
1− α
2
1− θ
2
λ′3
=
1− θ
2
1
2
(λ3 + λ
′
3 + α(λ3 − λ
′
3))
=
1− θ
2
1
2
1
θ
(θ (λ3 + λ
′
3) + α(λ
′
3 − λ3) + α (θ(λ3 − λ
′
3)− (λ
′
3 − λ3)))
=
(1− θ)
2
χ
θ
+
1− θ
2
1
2
α
θ
(1− θ)(λ′3 − λ3).
Since we have also λ′1 +
1−θ
2
λ′3 ≥ λ1 +
1−θ
2
λ3, then τ
′ ≥ (1−θ)
2
χ
θ
: for a
fixed χ, the lowest weight on δ1 that can be observed for Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) can
be obtained by some γ1 and γ2. Using a similar proof, the same result holds
for the lowest weight on δ2 that can be observed for Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)), which
means that the highest weight on δ1 that can be observed for Π⊗(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q))
can also be obtained by some γ1 and γ2.
Therefore, there exists R such that ϕ(R) = Π⊗ (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)).
6.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Let p, q ∈ ∆({1, 2}), with p 6= q. For all α, θ ∈ [0, 1], we have:
Π⊗ (ϕ({p}), ϕ({q})) = Π⊗ ({p}, {q})
Thus ϕ (Π⊗ ({p}, {q})) = Π ⊗ (ϕ({p}), ϕ({q})) iff ϕ (Π⊗ ({p}, {q})) = Π ⊗
({p}, {q}), which implies θ = 1. Thus if Π and ϕ commute, it must be the case
that θ = 1. The converse is trivial.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We use the same notations as in the proof of Proposition 3. We have:
Π⊗ (ϕ(δ12), ϕ(δ1)) = Π⊗ (
1− θ
2
δ1 +
1− θ
2
δ2 + θδ12, δ1)
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=(
1 + α
2
1− θ
2
+
1− α
2
)
δ1 +
(
1− α
2
1− θ
2
)
δ2
+
[(
1 + α
2
)
(1−
1− θ
2
)−
(
1− α
2
)
(
1− θ
2
)
]
δ12.
On the other hand:
ϕ (co (δ12 ∪ {δ1})) = ϕ (δ12) =
1− θ
2
δ1 +
1− θ
2
δ2 + θδ12.
Thus if Π⊗ (ϕ(δ12), ϕ(δ1)) = ϕ (co (δ12 ∪ {δ1})), it implies that
1− α
2
1− θ
2
=
1− θ
2
,
and thus α = θ = 1. Thus (i) implies (ii). The converse is trivial.
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